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ABSTRACT. A considerable literature exists regard-
ing the moral obligation to keep one’s promises.
Several authors have focused on the exceptional cir-
cumstances which may or should excuse this moral
duty. Less frequently discussed is the question of how
this general moral obligation and its possible excep-
tions play out in the context of negotiable written
promises to pay money, i.e., so-called “commercial
paper.”
This paper focuses on the application of the legal
rules governing commercial paper, and on the ethical
implications involved in the application of those rules.
More specifically, it asks whether the assertion of the
technical doctrine known as “holder in due course,”
and the denial of that status in some cases, promotes
ethical behavior in the marketplace. By examining the
circumstances of one case, involving a substantial
investment and a large bank, I hope to shed some




Modern global capitalism requires – almost by
definition – the availability of large amounts of
mobile capital. The biggest projects may need
massive funding – tens of millions, or even
hundreds of millions of dollars. The huge multi-
national corporations may be capable of gener-
ating much of their funding internally, by
reinvesting profits, but even they sometimes need
additional financial infusions from “the outside.”
For would-be entrepreneurs, and smaller existing
firms, exploitation of their great new ideas will
typically require “selling” the new idea to
persons who have money to invest. These indi-
viduals or organizations may be asked to take an
equity stake in the new venture, or simply to lend
money. Our examples here concern equity
investors.
The promoter of the new project explains it
to the prospective investor, who is persuaded to
make the investment. If the project succeeds,
profits are made and distributed – and everyone
is happy. If the project fails, and bankruptcy
ensues, the investor has lost the amount advanced
and is likely to be quite un-happy (although there
may be some beneficial, if unintended, tax con-
sequences). Economic history provides many
examples of spectacular successes – and spectac-
ular failures.1
The defrauded investor
Our problem here is more complicated, for
several reasons. First, our investor did not
advance cash money to the promoter, but rather
promised to pay the amount of the agreed invest-
ment, at some future time, in the form of a nego-
tiable promissory note. Second, the investor was
defrauded by the promoter, who knowingly mis-
represented significant facts about the nature and
circumstances of the project. And finally, the
dispute is no longer between the promoter/crook
and the investor/victim, because the promissory
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note has been sold by the promoter to a bank or
other third party, who is now trying to enforce
it against the defrauded investor.
It is this third-party lawsuit against the
defrauded investor that raises the legal and ethical
questions we want to examine.
Negotiable instruments
Commercial paper was created several centuries
ago by the merchants of medieval Europe.2 With
brigands in the woods, and thieves in the
towns, carrying large sums of cash was extremely
hazardous, to say the least. (It’s safe to say that
things are only marginally better today, in that
regard.) What the merchant community needed
was a payment mechanism that would be gener-
ally accepted in lieu of cash. Their solution was
commercial paper – written promises to pay
cash, or orders to another person to pay cash.
Based on the rules and understandings developed,
sellers of goods and services could receive these
“scraps of paper”3 from their buyers, and then
sell them to third parties for cash. The third
parties were assured that if they bought the
instruments in good faith, they would collect
from the buyer/debtors in most cases. This assur-
ance was given through application of the
“holder in due course” doctrine.
In simplest terms, the holder in due course
doctrine says that the good faith transferee of a
negotiable instrument (the HDC) can enforce
it as written, despite the existence of certain
problems in the underlying transaction. For
instance, the seller’s non-delivery of the promised
goods or nonperformance of the promised
services will not prevent the HDC of a nego-
tiable instrument from collecting against the
disappointed buyer. Likewise, the seller’s misrep-
resentation of the goods or services does not
prevent the HDC from receiving the full amount
of the instrument. Buyers who have executed
such instruments are required to pay for the
proverbial “dead horse” – and then to seek
whatever recourse they can from their seller.
In the United States, commercial paper law
was codified first in the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law (N.I.L.), and then as Article 3
of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) The
UCC is currently in force in all 50 states.
Northwestern v. Maggio
The application of the HDC rules in a defrauded
investor case is illustrated by Northwestern National
Insurance Co. v. Maggio.4 In 1981, Maggio invested
in a limited partnership organized by a former
astronaut to develop an optoelectronic scanner to
provide security at airports, oil fields, and similar
installations. Maggio signed a $55,000 non-
interest-bearing negotiable note representing his
investment. The note, due in 1990, was sold
first to a venture-capital company, and then
resold to Goldman Sachs, an investment firm.
Goldman Sachs, in turn, sold it at a 50 percent
discount to Northwestern. When the note came
due in October, 1990, Maggio refused to pay
Northwestern, claiming that he had been
defrauded by the promoters of the limited
partnership. 
The specific issue raised in the case was
whether Northwestern could qualify as an
HDC, since it had paid only half of the note’s
face value, and had bought it as part of a large
group of notes. Maggio claimed that the large
discount and the “bulk” purchase disqualified
Northwestern as an HDC, and that he could thus
assert his fraud defense to avoid liability.5 Both
the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Northwestern. Maggio had to pay for his “dead
horse.” 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust v. Robinson
The specific ethical question we are asking is
raised by the facts in Manufacturers Hanover Trust
v. Robinson.6 Robinson and the other investors
signed a total of forty promissory notes, each of
which was for $2 million, representing their
investments in a limited partnership to develop
the office building at 600 Grant Street,
Pittsburgh, PA. The promoters failed to disclose
the presence of asbestos in the building (which
would make it much more expensive to
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renovate), and seriously misrepresented the
amount of already available vacant office space in
the city (which would make it much more dif-
ficult to rent space in a renovated 600 Grant
building). The promoters of the 600 Grant Street
Associates Limited Partnership (GSALP) sold
Robinson’s note directly to Manufacturers, and
sold the other 39 notes to two other banks.
Those two banks, Marine Midland and Security
Pacific, later re-sold the other 39 notes to Manu-
facturers. Marine indorsed 37 notes as follows:
“PAY TO THE ORDER OF __________
WITHOUT RECOURSE
MARINE MIDLAND BANK, N.A.
BY (signature of bank officer).”
Security Pacific used similar language to transfer
the two notes it sold to Manufacturers.
At this point, under commercial paper rules,
Manufacturers was an HDC of all 40 notes, and
thus entitled to collect the entire $80,000,000
from the defrauded investors. That would have
been the result, but for the intervention of
certain Manufacturers’ personnel.
When 600 GSALP defaulted in making
promised payments to its investors, bank officers
at Manufacturers became concerned about the
collectibility of their $80 million worth of
promissory notes. They went to the vault and
removed the notes. For some “inexplicable”7
reason, using a rubber stamp, the officers then
stamped “600 GRANT STREET ASSOCIATES
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP” in the blank space
on the original indorsements of the 39 notes
from Marine Midland and Security Pacific. With
that indorsement, the notes again belonged to
600 GSALP – the crooks! Then, acting as agents
for 600 GSALP (they had been so authorized),
the Manufacturers officers indorsed the 39 notes
back to Manufacturers: “600 Grant Street
Associates Limited Partnership without recourse.
By: Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company as
Agent, Attorney-in-fact for 600 Grant Street
Associates Limited Partnership. By: (signature of
officer) Vice President.” Now the 39 notes were
again owned by Manufacturers. (Robinson’s note
did not go through this process, since it had
been purchased directly from 600 GSALP by
Manufacturers.)
At the point in time when Manufacturers thus
“reacquired” the 39 notes from 600 GSALP, it
was aware of possible irregularities in the original
transaction. Its officers had gone to “inventory”
the notes precisely because they were concerned
about the possibility of litigation. As a reacquirer
with notice of irregularities concerning the
notes, they could not qualify at that point as an
HDC.8 (There could also be a question as to
whether they re-acquired the 39 notes “for
value.”)9
Manufacturers had an alternate argument,
however. The law of commercial paper provides
a so-called “Shelter Rule.”10 A transferee of the
instrument who does not personally qualify as an
HDC can still claim all the rights of an HDC, if
the transferor was an HDC. Thus, a holder from
an HDC can enforce the instrument as written,
free of most of the debtor’s claimed defenses
against liability. Manufacturers claimed that both
of the other banks had been HDCs – and so had
it, for that matter, before the vice president
got loose in the vault with his rubber stamp.
With an HDC (or two) in its chain of title,
Manufacturers argued, it should be able to collect
the other 39 notes, as well as Robinson’s note. 
The difficulty with this argument is that
Manufacturers’ immediate transferee was not an
HDC, but rather 600 GSALP – the crooks. The
legal question the court had to answer to decide
the case was the scope of the Shelter Rule. Does
the Rule apply only in favor of a holder from a
holder in due course, i.e., only when there is a
transfer from an HDC to a non-HDC, so that
only the immediate transferee is protected? Or
does the Rule protect any and all holders through
a holder in due course, i.e., all later owners of
the instrument, even though they did not acquire
the instrument directly from the prior HDC
owner? Justice Lehner acknowledged that there
had been some ambiguity on this point under the
old N.I.L., but he thought that the applicable
UCC section clearly pointed to the more limited
interpretation.11 When it reacquired the 39
notes from 600 GSALP, then, Manufacturers
got all the rights of 600 GSALP. If the alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations of the promoters
can be proved, Manufacturers will not be able
to collect the $78 million represented by the
other 39 notes. Poor Mr. Robinson, however,
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will still have to pay for his dead horse, since
Manufacturers is an HDC of his $2,000,000
note.
The ethical question
A considerable literature exists regarding the
moral obligation to keep one’s promises.12 Most
commentators seem to accept “promise-keeping”
as a moral/ethical duty; indeed, one widely-dis-
tributed pamphlet on business ethics lists “Honor
Your Promises and Commitments” as number
one on its list of “50 Ways to ‘Walk the Talk’.”13
There are, however, several well-recognized
exceptions to this duty to perform as promised.
One whose promise was coerced by force or
threat of force should be able to disaffirm the
promise when the threat is removed.14 Likewise,
persons lacking the legal capacity to form agree-
ments – children, the mentally disabled, et al. –
should not be held responsible for performance
of their promises.15 Most relevant for our imme-
diate problem, persons whose promises were
induced by the other party’s fraud should not be
bound to fulfill those promises.16 Such is the legal
rule.17 Indeed, the Law generally gives the
defrauded party the option of having the fraud-
ulently-induced performance undone, if it has
already been given to the liar before the fraud is
discovered.18 It would seem logical – and fair –
that the moral/ethical rule should parallel the
legal one on this point. Any other position would
require the victim to acquiesce in the wrong-
doing, which hardly seems an ethically correct
injunction.
To apply the foregoing analysis to the Robinson
situation, it seems clear that the defrauded
investors would be ethically/morally justified in
refusing to pay the promoters – the crooks at 600
GSALP – if the promoters themselves had sued
to collect the $80 million. Surely a wrongdoer
should have no ethical standing when s/he asserts
a claim based on his or her own wrongful
conduct.19 Surely no ethical system worthy of the
label can mandate performance of promises
induced by the promisee’s wrongful (indeed,
criminal) conduct. Posed as an issue between the
promisor/victim and the promisee/criminal, the
ethical choice seems clear: it is ethical to refuse
to pay the criminal.
But again, that is not the exact situation pre-
sented in Robinson. The party to whom the
promises were originally made – the fraudulent
promoters – are not themselves trying to enforce
the promises. As indicated above, the promoters
sold the promissory notes in question to three
banks. Manufacturers Bank, which had bought
only one note from 600 GSALP, subsequently
bought the other 39 notes from the other two
banks and is now suing to enforce all 40 of the
notes. Its claim for collecting the money repre-
sented by the 40 notes is based on its special
status under the law as a “Holder in Due
Course.” To avoid having to pay, the makers of
the other 39 notes (i.e., those that were resold
to Manufacturers by the other two banks) are
asserting a legal “technicality.” Under the current
legal rules, Manufacturers can not qualify for
HDC status.
Thus we come to the specific problem raised
by the Robinson case: Is it ethical to assert a legal
technicality to avoid liability on one’s contract,
where that liability is based on a fraudulent trans-
action? Phrased more blatantly, in terms of the
facts of Robinson – is it ethical to take advantage
of the incompetence/stupidity of a bank’s vice
president, so as to avoid liability to the bank?
Posed this way, the question does seem to point
towards a “no” answer; no, it’s not ethical.
“Taking advantage” of someone’s innocent (albeit
stupid) mistake would not seem to be “praise-
worthy” conduct. However, a closer look dis-
closes that the problem is not quite that simple.
In the first place, the bank is itself trying to
use a legal technicality – the HDC rule – to
“take advantage” of the buyer by enforcing a
fraudulent contract. But for the concept of
negotiability and the attendant HDC rule, the
defrauded buyer could assert the seller’s fraud to
prevent the transferee of the account receivable
from collecting. It is only because of the tech-
nical HDC rules that a defrauded buyer is pre-
vented from doing so. It is in fact generally true
that a transferee of property receives only as
much interest in that property as the transferor
had.20 One who buys goods from a thief has to
return them to the rightful owner, even though
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the buyer was acting in good faith at the time
of purchase; a person with no title can pass no
title, even to a good faith purchaser.21 However,
the same section of the UCC also says that a
person with voidable title to goods has the power
to pass a valid title to a good faith purchaser.22
(The transferee has a voidable title where there
was a voluntary transfer, but the transferor was
defrauded, or lacked mental capacity to make a
binding contract.) For real estate transfers, which
are not covered by the UCC, the general rule
prevails.23 Thus the law goes both ways on this
type of problem, and “the devil is in the details.”
Second, the collectibility of the 39 notes
depends on the bank’s status as an HDC. If it is
not an HDC, the 39 investors who signed the
notes can use the promoters’ fraud to avoid lia-
bility.24 The legal technicality which prevents the
debtor from asserting defenses is thus dependent
on a further technicality – the status of the holder
as an HDC. (“He who lives by technicalities shall
perish by technicalities.”) 
Third, both parties to the lawsuit failed, in a
sense, to do adequate “due diligence” on the
underlying project – the investors initially, and
the bank when it purchased the notes. There is
thus more than enough “fault” to go around.
Arguably, the bank is even more at fault, since it
was its own stupidity that denied it the neces-
sary status as HDC, after it had initially achieved
that status. Where one of two “innocent” parties
must sustain a loss, the law generally places the
loss on the party who was better able to avoid
its occurrence.25 In our case, that appears to be
the bank.
Fourth, while these are undoubtedly wealthy,
sophisticated investors, it is the bank and its
officers who are the “pros from Dover.” Finance
is the bank’s business! They must know the rules
of the game they are playing! They are respon-
sible for knowing them! Their failure to know
them and to use them is gross incompetence of
the worst kind! Indeed, the officers involved
should be summarily dismissed, or at the very
least demoted to positions where they have no
access to funds or documents.
Fifth, if there are policy reasons for protecting
HDCs, so as to ensure the availability of capital,
that protection should be carefully circumscribed
(as it in fact is). Recognizing the injustice of the
HDC rule in consumer transactions, the Federal
Trade Commission adopted Regulation 433,
which essentially abolishes the HDC rule in
“consumer transactions.”26 Banks and finance
companies who are buying consumer accounts
are thus required to do “due diligence” investi-
gations of the goods and services sellers from
whom the financing agencies are buying the
consumer accounts. As defined, however,
Regulation 433 does not apply to investment
contracts, or to sales of goods with a purchase
price of more than $25,000. Perhaps the HDC
rule does still make sense for the financing of
commercial purchases of goods or services. But
it’s just possible that the rule may need further
modification for investment contracts.
Ethical standards
How do various ethical standards and “tests”
apply to our problem?27 At minimum, ethical
behavior requires compliance with applicable
legal rules and requirements. This the investors
are doing, by insisting that the full and exact legal
requirements of the HDC rule be applied to their
situation.
What of the Aristotelian system of ethics?28
Certainly, keeping one’s promises was a large part
of what made a person worthy of honor. But
what about promises that were extorted by fraud?
Would the person of honor also be required to
keep those as well? Perhaps one could argue that
the person of honor would take the bitter
medicine, perform as promised in favor of an
“innocent” third party, and then seek recourse
against the wrongdoer. But one could also argue
that a person seeking to enforce a promise based
on fraud (Manufacturers) was itself without
“honor,” and thus itself deserving of condemna-
tion.
Biblical injunctions are likewise inconclusive.29
Bearing false witness against one’s neighbor is
condemned in the Ninth Commandment, but it
does not condemn “lying” in generic terms.
Committing fraud would surely seem to violate
the mandate to “do unto others as you would
have them do unto you.” That application,
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however, only condemns the crooked seller; it
provides no guidance to the victim of the fraud
as to the necessity of honoring the fraudulently
induced promise.
Nor does the Kantian imperative – “act always
in such a way that you could compel your
behavior to be universalized” – seem to shed
much light on our problem.30 In fact, our
investors’ behavior has been “universalized,”
by the applicable section of the Uniform
Commercial Code! We can of course still debate
whether society has chosen to universalize the
correct rule on this point, but the fact remains that
we have in fact already adopted a “universal rule”
covering this situation.
What about the “greatest good for the greatest
number” formulation of the Utilitarians? The
mathematics of our problem are anything but
clear. Noting that there are always more debtors
than creditors will not advance the analysis very
far, since application of the HDC rules may
have both good and bad effects on both debtors
and creditors. Denial of HDC status in certain
situations may have the long-term effect of
increasing the cost of credit, or even its denial
altogether, to the ultimate detriment of debtors.
On the other hand, if the rules force third-party
financers to perform better “due diligence”
investigations, defaults may decrease, to the
ultimate benefit of all parties. Thus, as is true in
many such situations in the private sector, it’s not
easy to calculate just what the “greatest good”
really is.
There might also be differing views on how
the “Public/Family Knowledge” Test would
apply to our problem. As one of the investors,
would/should you be ashamed to have it widely
known that you had refused to pay your $2
million note because you had been defrauded?
One suspects that most people would be more
ashamed to have it known that they had been
defrauded, than that they had subsequently (and
successfully) refused to pay their notes. Being the
victim of a fraud implies a certain degree of
stupidity, or at least gullibility. Refusing to pay
the fraudulently-induced obligation indicates a
willingness to stand up for one’s rights. One
could certainly imagine that many of these
investors would be enthusiastically telling friends
and associates of this successful thwarting of the
attempted fraudulent scheme. One also imagines
that poor Mr. Robinson would not be broad-
casting his “honorable” $2 million payment for
a dead horse. It’s also a bit difficult to believe that
an investor who paid the $2 million even though
not legally required to do so would earn many
public encomiums; the public reaction might
rather be: “what a dumb thing to do!”
At best, then, these various ethical tests and
standards seem to provide inconclusive guidance
in answering the original question posed by the
Manufacturers case. If anything, they seem to
point to a “yes” answer: “yes, it is ethical to use
one legal technicality to cancel another legal
technicality.” It is “honorable” to stand up for
one’s rights, to try to frustrate the fraudulent
scheme, to refuse to play the role of a passive
victim. If we can agree that it is honorable to
resist evil, and fraud is evil, then it must be
resisted. If the basic HDC rule has the unin-
tended effect of promoting fraud, then the
limitations and qualifications surrounding the
HDC rule must be used whenever possible to
keep fraud confined within as small a territory
as possible.
To the 39 investors, congratulations! To Mr.
Robinson, condolences. To Manufacturers (and
especially, the vice president with the rubber
stamp), condemnation – and a recommendation:
learn your business!
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